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 Positive Free Speech 
and Public Access to Courts 
 JUDITH  TOWNEND 
 Even the most casual observer of courts in the UK, whether through crime dramas or news 
reports, will likely have some awareness of the guiding principle that for justice to be done, 
it must be seen to be done. But if one digs beneath that popular and well-cemented phrase, 
understood as critical to the rule of law, it becomes clear that open justice takes many 
diff erent forms, and is in practice a complex principle to administer and enforce. Clearly, 
the UK courts have a positive obligation in law to provide information about their activi-
ties, but to what extent ? 1 Just how much, and by what method and why, are questions that 
are contested and open for interpretation. 
 Th is chapter uses the positive free speech framework and normative arguments 
forwarded in this collection to address these questions and to suggest how the judiciary 
and courts service should be publicly communicating what happens in court. Accepting 
the premise that there are positive duties on the state that  ‘ insist[s] that everyone be able 
to  exercise their rights ’ 2 in order to  ‘ support diverse speech environments ’, 3 and that posi-
tive free speech is a  ‘ central element existing alongside concerns about legal limitations on 
speech ’, 4 it proposes a way forward for further enhancing positive free speech in a court 
setting. 
 Th e chapter fi rst sets out an explanation of the way in which courts are accessed, at both 
the theoretical and the practical level. It then uses two case studies, a recent terrorism trial 
and a public inquiry, to examine further the way that courts are accessed in practice. Lastly, 
it considers the relevance of the government ’ s  ‘ open government ’ and  ‘ open data ’ policy 
agenda. 5 When taken as a whole, this account suggests that there are existing negative and 
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positive free speech elements to reporting and accessing courts in English law, but that the 
judiciary and courts service need to do more to protect an important positive liberty for 
all citizens. 
 I. Free Speech in the Courts 
 A. Open Justice Principle in Th eory and Practice 
 Th e root of open justice runs deep, and it has grown and developed over centuries during 
which there have been dramatic technological and social shift s. In fact, it came about  ‘ almost 
by historical accident ’ as an evolution of the public gatherings at court in the Middle Ages. 6 
Over time, the principle was succinctly articulated as an essential component of justice 
and an important means of ensuring a fair trial, which is protected under Article 6 of the 
 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as well as in the common law. 
 Th e open justice principle has served a number of purposes relating to court access. 7 For 
Robertson and Nicol,  ‘ trials derive their legitimacy from being conducted in public ’. 8 Th ey, 
and other scholars, off er a range of associated benefi ts of this public justice: it discourages 
perjury and protects against judicial error; it protects the parties from an unfair trial; and it 
helps maintain public confi dence in the courts. Th ese factors can be described as part of the 
 accountability rationale . 
 Robertson and Nicol also suggest factors which are less well interrogated in judicial 
decisions: reporting  ‘ enhances public knowledge and appreciation of the workings of the 
law ’, and it  ‘ permits the revelation of matters of genuine public interest ’. 9 Th ese, I suggest, 
can be described as the  education rationale , particularly important at a time when cuts to 
legal aid have created a growing number of litigants-in-person, and when many civil claims 
are resolved out of court owing to the high fi nancial and personal cost of defending or 
bringing claims. Th e education justifi cation is extended with the proposition, acknowledged 
by the courts in some instances, 10 that the media needs to know particular details of cases to 
attract readers, and less tenably, to ensure news organisations ’ fi nancial survival. 11 
 Finally, there is the  deterrence rationale : the argument, usually made in debates over 
the naming of individuals, that publicity of proceedings deters the parties and the wider 
public from committing future off ences; as part of this process, the public and press are 
able to judge the named individuals involved. Th is is oft en described as  ‘ naming and sham-
ing ’, although it is also arguable that deterrence can be achieved even with anonymisation. 
Open justice in the Middle Ages may have been motivated by the logic of this third cate-
gory, but it is perhaps the least convincing rationale for complete openness of proceedings. 
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As  the  presiding judge found in a recent and rare case, when upholding the anonymity 
of the two convicted teenage defendants who were found guilty of murdering 39-year-old 
Angela Wrightson:  ‘ it is arguable that no further deterrence is necessary or, if it is, the 
naming of the individuals will add little to the fact that those responsible have been brought 
to justice, been convicted and been sentenced ’. 12 
 Th e rationales for open justice are wide-ranging, but the justifi cations for derogations 
from the principle  – at least in theory  – are more concise. According to the common law, for 
courts to hear a case in private, it must be deemed that there is a serious possibility that open 
proceedings would render impractical or frustrate the eff ective administration of justice: 
for example, by deterring prosecution of a case. 13 Th is will trump any competing argument, 
including the public interest served by open reporting. 
 Open justice, justifi ed in the ways described above, is oft en perceived as meaning 
complete transparency: that is, everything that takes place in the courtroom should be 
made public. In practice, justice ranges from opaque to translucent to transparent, depend-
ing on the types of proceedings and court or tribunal  – there are many shades of open 
justice. Opacity or translucence is achieved through a range of automatic and discretion-
ary  restrictions. In some cases, public access may be denied through the decision to move 
in camera, that is, into closed proceedings. Th is is common for parts of sensitive national 
security cases, for courts hearing privacy injunction applications and in courts such as the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, which 
hold hearings with no press or public permitted. 
 In some courts and cases, access may be allowed but reporting is restricted. By way of 
illustration, in the Court of Protection, a court which makes decisions on cases involving 
people deemed to lack mental capacity, a transparency regime permits regular access to the 
public and media with restricted reporting; 14 in the criminal courts, sexual off ence cases 
can be attended and reported, but victims of a wide range of sexual off ences are given life-
time anonymity. A variation of this model allows the postponement of reporting of certain 
information: for example, only very restricted details of allocation and sending hearings 
in the magistrates ’ courts can be reported at a preliminary stage. More problematically, in 
certain courts and cases, a more limited class of the public are allowed to attend. Th is is 
the model used in the family and youth courts, where accredited members of the media 
may attend private hearings closed to the public, and special reporting restriction regimes 
apply. 15 Beyond this range of automatic restrictions, the court can postpone or prohibit 
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other details  – such as individuals ’ names  – being reported on a case-by-case basis. Th ese 
automatic and discretionary restrictions may protect the administration of justice and a 
fair trial (by not prejudicing proceedings, for example), and rights associated with child 
welfare, and private and family life. 
 As will be shown in the case studies, approaches to digital openness vary greatly, not 
only between, but also within, diff erent categories of courts. Some courts have been far more 
proactive in publishing details of proceedings and decisions. Others rely almost entirely 
upon third party providers, such as the offi  cial law reports and the press, to communicate 
their proceedings. Th e predominant approach to open justice and access to information 
taken by the judiciary and Her Majesty ’ s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS), an execu-
tive agency of the Ministry of Justice, is protection of a neutral or negative principle, one 
of non-interference: non-censorship of proceedings (most courtrooms can be visited in 
person), and a judge may lift  restrictions upon application of a third party, such as a news-
paper. A positive liberty is also present, if oft en secondary: in many instances, there is a 
positive application of open justice, in which the court proactively notifi es parties of poten-
tial restrictions and publishes details of its work online. Obligations to safeguard the identity 
of witnesses or journalistic sources may also be seen as part of a positive liberty for those it 
protects. However, this positive approach, in which the court perceives a positive obligation 
to notify and inform, is not consistent or reliable across the courts service, and is vulnerable 
to error and oversight. 16 
 Th e notion that the public should be able to attend court, or have proceedings reported 
to them via a proxy such as the press, accords well with the freedom of expression concept 
under Article 10 ECHR, which provides a public right to receive and impart information 
and ideas. 17 Arguments in favour of increased access have oft en relied on Article 10. It is, 
however, the common law principle of open justice which has proved the more reliable 
weapon in the arsenal in a UK context, as there are limits to how Article 10 ECHR and its 
domesticated version under the Human Rights Act have been used positively to protect free 
speech. 18 
 B. Right to Report Courts 
 Most usually, Article 10 arguments have been articulated with regard to the right to report 
court proceedings. Th is builds on Lord Denning ’ s understanding of press reporters as the 
 ‘ watchdog of justice ’, that  ‘ every member of the public must be entitled to report in the public 
press all that he has seen and heard ’. 19 Th is remark, made in 1955, seems oddly broad for 
its time: the choice of the word  ‘ report ’ rather than  ‘ read ’ corresponds with the  ‘ imparting ’ 
component of Article 10, rather than the  ‘ receiving ’ element. At that time, very few members 
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of the public would have the means of communicating what they had observed in the public 
press. Reading it in the twenty-fi rst century, it makes more sense: it suggests that anyone 
attending court has an entitlement to report the proceedings  – which they can now easily 
do, via their electronic device on freely available social media and blogging platforms. 
Whether that would have been Lord Denning ’ s intention is open for discussion. 
 Despite Lord Denning ’ s broad understanding of this public entitlement, court report-
ing has largely been confi ned to a specialist  – if diminishing  – breed of individuals in 
the twentieth and twenty-fi rst centuries: the reporters producing the offi  cial law reports; 
and journalists employed by agencies, magazines, newspapers and broadcasters as court 
reporters and legal correspondents. Beyond this, reporting may be said to include any lists, 
results and transcripts published by the courts or a private provider, and written judgments, 
increasingly made available freely online. 
 Online technology has allowed lawyers increasingly to participate in reporting, whether 
through news items and commentary on their fi rm ’ s or chamber ’ s website and blogs, or 
on their own personal blogs. It has also facilitated members of the public to report court 
proceedings directly, without requiring the cooperation of a professional outlet. Despite 
this liberating technology, court reporting has remained oddly traditional, with a few excep-
tions, such as the freelance journalist Peter Jukes ’ s remarkably committed live tweeting of 
the phone hacking trials for seven months in 2014. Th e Criminal Practice Directions on 
tweeting from court make a distinction between representatives of the media and  ‘ legal 
commentators ’ on the one hand, 20 and ordinary members of the public on the other. 21 Th e 
latter category must seek special permission to tweet, whereas the former may tweet from 
open court proceedings without making a specifi c application. Nonetheless, a surge in 
regular citizen reporting is yet to occur, perhaps because it would be time-consuming and 
expensive to undertake for someone not employed to do so. It is worth noting that Jukes ’ s 
tweeting was facilitated by a well-publicised crowd-funding initiative. 
 A more dramatic social development, which is proving an ongoing challenge for the 
court and the Attorney General ’ s Offi  ce, is the social media interaction around the trial, 
whether involving parties and their families or the broader public. Much of this social media 
conversation is harmless, but some publications on social network services can threaten to 
prejudice a trial to a serious degree. In the original trial of two anonymised teenage girls 
for the murder of Angela Wrightson, for example, prejudicial Facebook activity around the 
case led to a retrial and a wide-ranging reporting restriction preventing media organisa-
tions from linking or posting reports of the case on social media. 22 Despite these events, 
a response by the government to its consultation on the impact of social media on crimi-
nal trials claimed that social media does not currently pose a threat to the criminal justice 
system and that the aforementioned case was not representative. 23 More recently, Stephen 
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Yaxley-Lennon, the former leader of the English Defence League, better known as Tommy 
Robinson, was found to have committed a contempt of court aft er he breached a reporting 
restriction imposed under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, by livestream-
ing a video from outside the public entrance to the court and aggressively confronting and 
fi lming some of the defendants as they arrived at court. 24 
 C. Right to Receive Court Information 
 As in other discussions on free expression, the right to receive information is oft en over-
looked in favour of a preoccupation with a right to report. Th is can be partly explained by 
the courts ’ passive and reactive approach. Challenges to restrictions are usually brought by 
media organisations with the fi nancial and legal resources to do so, and their concern tends 
to be with their right to report what they have observed in court and material that they 
already hold. On occasion, however, the right to information has been explicitly asserted. In 
 GNM v Westminster Magistrate ’ s Court , the newspaper sought access to documents in extra-
dition proceedings, partly relying on Article 10. Although the appeal court allowed access 
(breaking  ‘ new ground ’ in the application of the open justice principle, though not the nature 
of the principle itself), Lord Justice Toulson ’ s leading judgment was based on the common 
law rather than European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, although he 
acknowledged that the latter may be seen as supportive of the overall reasoning. 25 
 Th e judgment also illuminates the lack of clarity from the ECtHR on a right to informa-
tion; as noted elsewhere in this collection, ECHR jurisprudence is evolving on the question 
of a positive obligation to provide information. 26 In November 2016, the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR held back from recognising a freestanding right to receive information, confi rm-
ing that  ‘ the right to receive information cannot be construed as imposing on a State positive 
obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion ’. It did, however, recog-
nise that a positive obligation arises in two types of cases: fi rst, where disclosure of the 
information has been imposed by an enforceable judicial order; and secondly, where access 
to the information is instrumental for the individual ’ s exercise of his or her right to freedom 
of expression and where its denial constitutes an interference with that right. 27 In determin-
ing whether a denial of access to information constitutes an interference with an applicant ’ s 
freedom of expression rights, the following criteria should be considered in a given case: 
(i)  the purpose of the information request; (ii) the nature of the information sought; 
(iii) the role of the applicant; and (iv) whether the information is  ‘ ready and available ’. 28 
 While UK challenges such as  GNM v Westminster Magistrate ’ s Court and  Kennedy v 
 Charity Commission 29 could be placed within the  ‘ negative free speech ’ category as attempts 
by individuals and organisations to remove an obstacle (unsuccessful in the case of  Kennedy ), 
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they could also lead to a positive obligation on courts and other organisations to provide 
certain information. In this way,  GNM has led to a  ‘ default position ’ in which the media 
is entitled to have access to documents that have been placed before a judge and referred 
to in the course of proceedings. 30 Prior to this case, access to certain court documents 
was possible, relying on the Criminal and Civil Procedure Rules, but this ruling extended 
and embedded the position, proving practically useful for journalists in particular. Most 
recently and importantly, and further entrenching the decision in  GNM , the UK Supreme 
Court has upheld a Court of Appeal ruling that it was within a court ’ s inherent jurisdiction 
to allow non-parties inspection of a wide range of documents placed before the court or 
referred to in civil proceedings. 31 
 Th e availability of documents does not guarantee access to all the British public, however. 
To give a specifi c example, Part 5 of the Civil Practice Directions permits members of the 
public, for a prescribed fee, to obtain statements of case in civil litigation from civil courts, 
including the Queen ’ s Bench of the Royal Courts of Justice. 32 However, a number of obstacles 
have meant that this available data has not been readily accessible, though the introduction 
of electronic fi ling in 2019 has somewhat improved access. 33 Most importantly  – and this 
remains so under the new system  – the costs are prohibitively high, especially if an ordinary 
member of the public, or small organisation, wishes to access more than one or two claims 
at a time. For claims lodged before the introduction of e-fi ling, 34 the court must be visited in 
person, which may inhibit requesters with a disability, or those unable to travel to London 
during offi  ce hours because of other commitments or expense. For older claims made prior 
to the introduction of e-fi ling, a fi nal obstacle remains in locating a claim number with 
which to make an application for case documents; this process involves searching through a 
large ring binder of case listings, unless the number is retrieved by another means. 35 I have 
previously remarked that it is as if this court ’ s data, publicly available by law, is stored in an 
open fi ling cabinet with no drawer handles or labels. 36 Th e e-fi ling system improves this to 
some degree, but costs remain high, for no obvious reason, given that the court staff  are no 
longer burdened with the physical labour of locating and copying documents. 
 Th e availability of orders that restrict reporting is another concern for journalists 
and other actors. Plans to create a database of such orders for the media were abandoned 
owing to reportedly  ‘ eye-watering ’ costs that would be charged to the media by a private 
contractor. 37 As with the statements of case, court orders should be publicly accessible on 
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request, but this usually requires a physical visit to the court. Furthermore, if a journalist 
or member of the public has not attended every day of a trial, they may be unaware of any 
discretionary reporting restrictions that have been put in place (they would be expected 
to know the automatic ones, which raises a diff erent issue about access to legal educa-
tion in this regard). In 2014, the Law Commission recommended the creation of a portal 
where members of the public would be able to fi nd out if a postponement order under 
section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 had been made. 38 No such system has yet 
been developed, despite the government ’ s fi nancial commitment to digital court services 
and the ongoing programme of court reform and digitalisation, 39 and in any event it would 
be partial only in terms of its coverage of the range of discretionary restrictions that may be 
imposed. 
 Th e small press offi  ce for the judiciary supplies journalists with reporting restric-
tion orders from time to time. It cannot cover all UK courts ’ activity, however, and may 
not consider inquiries from other members of the public  – such as researchers and legal 
commentators  – with a legitimate desire to report court proceedings. To give one example, 
Lucy Reed, a specialist family barrister and blogger, who writes for a range of media and 
legal publications, but who is not an  ‘ accredited ’ journalist as understood by the family 
courts, found it extremely diffi  cult to access the reporting restriction orders associated with 
a series of family judgments related to the high-profi le murder of a child. 40 Th e judgments 
had been published online, but had subsequently been removed. Helpfully for Reed, they 
were made available by the judiciary press offi  ce on request, along with details of a report-
ing restriction order that had been imposed on some, but not all, of their contents. She 
wished to check whether any other relevant reporting restriction orders were in place before 
writing about the judgments. She was advised to contact the court directly; it replied, stat-
ing:  ‘ all family proceedings are confi dential, unless you are a party in the matter we cannot 
disclose any information to yourself  ’. It advised her to make an application to the court 
to seek the information; this is a process that would likely incur a fee of around  £ 200. She 
commented on the failings of a system that did not allow non-parties or non-accredited 
journalists to check the reporting restrictions in a case that was the subject of much public 
debate:  ‘ what about the self-employed journalist or the blogging citizen journalist  … how 
 are responsible bloggers to know what is and is not prohibited ? ’ 41 
 Happily for Reed, following her charity ’ s application to the Family Procedure Rules 
Committee, the court has now introduced a pilot which extends access to a limited class of 
legal bloggers, including qualifi ed lawyers in practice, working for an educational charity or 
employed by a higher education institution. 42 
 Th ere is similarly mixed practice around the supply of court lists. Some lists are made 
available through a private service called Courtserve, either for free or for a  subscription 
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fee. Some courts, such as the Royal Courts of Justice, publish their cause lists online. 
 ‘ Full ’ lists, which contain names, addresses and full charges, are made available to jour-
nalists by individual courts, and such access is ensured by a protocol agreement between 
HMCTS and two media representative groups, the News Media Association and the Society 
of Editors. 43 Th ese full lists may be made available to local independent bloggers as well 
as those working for traditional news organisations, but there is no consistent cross-court 
policy, which HMCTS attempted to address with new guidance issued in 2018. 44 In October 
2013, amendments to Criminal Procedure Rules 2013 to permit online publication of all 
court lists were approved by the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, but this has not yet 
resulted in any major change to practice. 45 
 With regard to the outcomes of cases, no substantial collated results data is made available 
to either journalists or the wider public. As will be discussed below, if such data were made 
available to the public, important legal and ethical questions would need to be addressed 
through public consultation. Some internal collation does take place which informs regu-
lar statistical publications, but the data available publicly is very limited  – so much so that 
even the Ministry of Justice had to  ‘ estimate ’ the number of defamation trials that had taken 
place in a given year for its impact assessment on the Defamation Bill in 2012. 46 Beyond 
this, written judgments are either published on courts ’ or the main judiciary website 
and/or on the third party charitable site BAILII. Not all courts have consistent procedures 
on this, and moreover many criminal and civil cases  – especially those in the lower courts  – 
do not result in a written judgment at all. Sentencing remarks in criminal cases may be 
made publicly available by the judiciary press offi  ce, particularly in cases attracting signifi -
cant media attention, but again there is no consistent practice on this. A notable exception 
is the UK Supreme Court, which, as well as sending its judgments to BAILII, tracks all the 
stages of its cases online. 
 Th e Freedom of Information Act 2000 would have provided an ideal opportunity to 
put a carefully draft ed positive obligation into statute, and to clarify the type of court data 
that should be proactively disseminated, but in fact the opposite occurred. Section 32 of 
the Act provides a complete exemption for court records, meaning the legislation  – with 
its positive obligation on public authorities to provide information to the public  – permits 
only a limited type of information to be requested about judicial and court processes and 
activity. 
 To summarise, there is a positive duty for the judiciary and courts service to make avail-
able various court materials to the public, but in practice this is not suffi  ciently fulfi lled. 
Th e public ’ s right to information is hampered by cumbersome and expensive systems that 
require physical access to court. Furthermore, complicated systems of hybrid access which 
usually favour journalists over other types of requesters are inadequate in a contemporary 
digital publishing environment. Th e failings of the system were exposed dramatically in the 
trial of Erol Incedal. 
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 II. Case Study in  ‘ Negative Free Speech ’ : Th e  Incedal Case 
 In 2013, a journalist spotted an unusual advance notice of a reporting restriction on the 
court noticeboard. If granted, it would allow an entire criminal trial to be conducted 
behind closed doors, with no press or public present. Th e media mobilised a joint 
response to the court, although the presiding judge, Nicol J, 47 decided to hold the entire 
trial in camera. Such measures, deemed necessary to protect the eff ective administra-
tion of justice and national security, would be enforced by court order and ministerial 
certifi cates. 48 
 A consortium of 12 media organisations appealed. Th e Court of Appeal agreed with the 
presiding judge that there was  ‘ a signifi cant risk  – at the very least, a serious  possibility  – 
that the administration of justice would be frustrated were the trial to be conducted in 
open Court ’. 49 While maintaining restrictions, it relaxed them in an unusual and hitherto 
unknown arrangement, with three levels of access dependent on the nature of daily proceed-
ings. Stage 1, as it was referred to in court, was in open court, and allowed the public and 
the media to attend and report freely (in sessions including the swearing in of the jury, the 
judge ’ s introductory remarks, verdicts and sentencing). Stages 2 and 3 were heard in camera, 
with the judge and court staff , the jury, the defendant, police, prosecution and defence 
lawyers, and  – for Stage 2 only  – also a small number of  ‘ accredited ’ journalists present. 
Th e accredited journalists were permitted to take notes during the Stage 2  proceedings, but 
could not carry those notes out of court. Journalists have described how they were asked 
to lock their mobile phones inside a soundproof box and put their  ‘ secret ’ notebooks in 
a safe. Additionally, they were not allowed to disclose what they had observed except to 
nominated legal representatives for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. According to 
 Th e Guardian ’ s Ian Cobain, journalists were instructed that this should only take place 
in a closed room in which mobile phones were switched off , with no notes taken. 50 
 Importantly, the court also allowed the defendants to be named as Mounir Rarmoul-
Bouhadjar, who was charged with possessing a terrorist document (count three), and 
Erol Incedal, who faced the same charge (count two) and another of preparing an act of 
 terrorism (count one). 51 Th e unusual reporting arrangements commenced in October 
2014. Th e second defendant, Mounir Rarmoul-Bouhadjar, pleaded guilty to possessing a 
terrorist document. At trial, Erol Incedal was found guilty of the same off ence, but the jury 
failed to reach a verdict on the other charge. He was eventually acquitted at a second trial, 
held under the same reporting arrangements. 52 
Positive Free Speech and Public Access to Courts 145
  53  D  Casciani ,  ‘ Erol Incedal: Th e Trial We Couldn ’ t Report ’,  BBC News ,  26 March 2015 . 
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 Th ere is no offi  cial record of how the trial divided into each stage, but the BBC reported 
that 10 hours of evidence were heard in public, 28 hours were heard in private with  ‘ accred-
ited ’ journalists present, and 30 hours were heard in private without any press or public 
attending. 53 Th is three-tier system led to the case being widely characterised by media 
organisations as a  ‘ secret trial ’. Despite having privileged access, the  ‘ accredited ’ journalists 
made clear their discomfort with the nature of the trial in articles and tweets. Th ere was also 
concern about the manner in which security was controlled. Th e  London Evening Standard 
claimed that one journalist  ‘ was stopped from leaving court even though he had taken no 
notes ’, and that  ‘ a second was threatened with arrest at his home when he had not even been 
in court ’. 54 
 Th e reasons for the decisions taken during the  Incedal case remain unclear, as  Th e Times 
illustrated in its report on the verdict of the second trial, in a dramatic fashion:  ‘ a law student 
jailed yesterday for possession of a bomb-making manual was a  ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ’. 55 Th e 
media has not been able to report the prosecution ’ s main argument, the evidence that led 
the jury to fi nd Incedal not guilty of preparing an act of terrorism, or the reason why these 
matters have been concealed. 
 Following the trial, various organisations sought to report the  ‘ core issues ’ in the private 
sessions, but their initial applications were rejected. Th is decision was upheld in the Court 
of Appeal in February 2016, with the court fi nding that a departure from the principle of 
open justice was necessary for justice to be done. While supportive of the trial judge ’ s deci-
sion, the justices raised concerns about procedure adopted, and also about the defi ciency 
of information on which they had to rely. Th ey observed that normally they would look to 
previous decisions to determine issues which were similar. In this case, however, relevant 
 ‘ closed judgments ’ were  ‘ not retained within the court fi les or, as far as we have been able to 
ascertain, in any specifi ed place within the court ’. Th e judges requested that a working group 
be set up to advise the court on further action; a Practice Direction on closed judgments has 
since been published specifying a process for the retainment of closed judgments in certain 
types of proceedings. 56 
 Th e case was characterised by an approach that emphasised  ‘ negative free speech ’. It saw 
the courts do little to facilitate public access and understanding. Indeed, events surround-
ing this case exposed systematic issues in the courts ’ managing of access. Access was only 
secured on the intervention by media organisations and with the court lift ing its initial 
restrictions, rather than the court proactively considering and protecting speech from the 
outset. 
 Th e case also highlighted three key practical issues. First, there is no coordinated and 
systematic administrative procedure that guides the publicising of reporting restrictions 
and their application. Although notice of the restriction was advertised on a noticeboard, 
general knowledge of what was proposed was still reliant on a journalist being present in 
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court and alert to the irregularity of the situation. It appears that there was no proactive 
notifi cation of any media organisation through other channels in this case. 
 Second, decisions can be arbitrary. Th e resource and experience of legally represented 
media organisations allowed them to bring a challenge and to secure  ‘ accredited ’ status for 
their journalists. Th e court failed to consider the rights of smaller forms of media, such 
as specialist and online-only platforms. Furthermore, it may have been valuable to have 
non-media observers present during the Stage 2 proceedings, who would play a diff erent 
watchdog role in holding the judicial process to account and whose reporting would not 
have been constrained by a media organisation ’ s agenda (which is necessarily guided by 
the newsworthiness of particular details). Lawrence McNamara has suggested that there 
is a strong case for giving legal professional bodies and specialist NGOs a similar status as 
independent observers. 57 
 Th irdly, there is a paucity of material on transparency decisions themselves, with 
previous cases not properly documented in the court system. (Th is also occurred with 
the granting of so-called super injunctions and anonymised privacy injunctions before 
a new procedure was introduced in 2011 following a report by the Master of the Rolls. 58 
It has since transpired, however, that the data is not necessarily complete, and the collection 
system is being reviewed by the judiciary. 59 ) 
 Th e way in which the publicity of this trial was handled has been widely criticised, and 
not only by the media. Th e Lord Chief Justice, Lord Th omas, said that  ‘ there ought to be 
very much clearer guidelines and rules ’ in future. He stated that the press should be able to 
 ‘ see such material as can be shown to them so they know what the argument is about ’ and 
hoped that a  ‘ proper way of dealing with [anonymised defendants] ’ could be developed. 60 
 III. Case Study in  ‘ Positive Free Speech ’ : 
Th e Leveson Inquiry 
 In contrast to court and tribunal proceedings, public inquiries have sometimes taken a 
much more proactive approach in protecting judicial and executive accountability and 
supplying information to a public audience. More could be done to improve the formats 
of digital evidence and reports to make them more searchable and accessible to public 
audiences, but in general they show how judicial proceedings can be shared with a wide 
audience, albeit that public inquiries are distinct from other types of court proceedings and 
instigated to investigate particular events that have caused or are capable of causing public 
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concern. Th e Leveson Inquiry, established by the Prime Minister, David Cameron, in July 
2011, broke new ground in the way it was communicated online, and was the fi rst inquiry 
under the Inquiries Act 2005 that properly utilised online space. It was also the fi rst to be 
accompanied by a continual stream of third party social media commentary. 61 
 Th e Leveson Inquiry was bound by the terms of section 18 of the Inquiries Act 
2005, which states that an inquiry must allow public access to inquiry proceedings and 
information: 
 (1)  subject to any restrictions imposed by a notice or order under section 19, the chairman must 
take such steps as he considers reasonable to secure that members of the public (including 
reporters) are able: 
 (a)  to attend the inquiry or to see and hear a simultaneous transmission of proceedings at 
the inquiry; 
 (b)  to obtain or to view a record of evidence and documents given, produced or provided 
to the inquiry or inquiry panel. 
 A narrow reading of section 18(1) could mean merely facilitating physical access at the 
court rather than via a website. Lord Justice Leveson ’ s approach indicated a more expansive 
interpretation, with timely and extensive communication of the inquiry online. A bespoke 
website made a range of material available during the inquiry ’ s proceedings: information 
about the inquiry, rulings by Lord Justice Leveson (on core participants or admissibility of 
evidence, for example), transcripts of evidence and written evidence (once formally read 
in). Most importantly, proceedings could be watched live or at a later date online, except 
for a few rare examples in which anonymity or special provisions applied. Th is opened the 
hearings to people unable to travel to court. 
 Th e courtroom itself had limited public and media access, and so an overfl ow Annexe 
(a marquee in the Royal Courts of Justice grounds) was opened, with sections for the media 
and the public to watch the proceedings from several screens. Th is had both pros and cons: 
while it allowed journalists to work in perhaps a more comfortable and relaxed environ-
ment, and view a scrolling transcript, they lost court-side immediacy. Journalists were also 
limited by the fact that they did not have access to the documents as they were discussed in 
the inquiry. Th e document appeared on the screen in the Annexe, but as one reporter cover-
ing the inquiry explained,  ‘ you were trying to take down the document at the same time as 
you were trying to listen to people being questioned ’. 62 
 Th e inquiry was also communicated via Twitter, although not in an offi  cial capacity; 
the inquiry ’ s own Twitter account only published one update between July 2012 and the 
report ’ s publication in November. It was used for posting notifi cations about updates to the 
website, rather than interacting with online followers. Th e surrounding conversation was 
diverse and interactive. Largely uninhibited by the strict contempt restrictions that would 
generally apply in court proceedings, a range of commentators  – including campaigners, 
journalists, bloggers and academics  – reported and commented on what was taking place. 
Sometimes this activity played a key part in extending the  ‘ public watchdog ’ role of the 
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press, drawing attention to key passages and sharing important information in the public 
interest. At other times, it was fl ippant and trivial. For example, one of the inquiry counsel 
gained  notoriety  – partly due to further promotion by the mainstream media  – during an 
episode in which Twitter users mocked her for apparently gazing at witness Hugh Grant 
during his evidence, tagging their updates  ‘ # womanontheleft  ’. 63 
 Th e Leveson Inquiry recognised the distinct role of reporters and journalists, but also 
the part of the broader public audience. Th is refl ected section 18(1) of the Inquiries Act 
2005, the wording of which indicates that reporters are a special sub-set of the public. In 
the inquiry, reporters were given special privileges: a small number had guaranteed access 
to press seats in courtroom 73, a portion of the Annexe was reserved for the press, and they 
received communications from a dedicated press offi  cer. It is likely that the timing of the 
report ’ s release on 29 November 2012 to a room of invited journalists was chosen to suit a 
broadcast media schedule. Perhaps to avoid partisan national newspapers dominating the 
coverage with their take on the fi ndings, Leveson LJ announced the report in a statement at 
lunchtime, which gave the broadcasters, regulated by rules of impartiality, a chance to run 
their reports in the aft ernoon and evening television and radio news bulletins, alongside the 
newspapers ’ online coverage but ahead of the next morning ’ s front pages. 
 In these ways, priority was given to national news media actors, but this was not at the 
cost of public access. Aft er the report was released, hyperlinks to the report ’ s four volumes 
and the executive summary were published on the website. Since the conclusion of part 
one of the inquiry (the government has decided that part two will not proceed), the website 
materials and video have been preserved by the National Archives. Furthermore, on more 
than one occasion, wider public  – rather than institutional media  – interests were given 
the greater weight. When media organisations challenged the admission of evidence from 
anonymous journalists represented by the National Union of Journalists, Lord Justice 
Leveson found in favour of the latter ’ s Article 10 rights. 64 
 Th e online communication  – both during and following the Leveson Inquiry  – is to be 
commended, although there are ways in which it could have been made even more acces-
sible. Th e transcripts and report were published in cumbersome non-machine-readable 
formats, which limited their accessibility. Th ird parties have attempted to make the vast and 
rich outputs more useable, although this has required a signifi cant investment of time. A 
service off ered by the civic organisation  ‘ mySociety ’ has produced search-friendly HTML 
versions of the transcripts, which cross-reference related material. 65 Th is allows, for example, 
a user easily to search all the oral evidence for a particular phrase (eg  ‘ data protection ’ ) or by 
witness, which would not be possible with the original formats. Robert Sharp, a writer and 
free speech campaigner, also converted the report into HTML to allow better functionality; 
his version cross-references parts of the multi-volume report with hyperlinks, allowing for 
improved reader comprehension and navigation. 66 A third off ering is Discover Leveson, a 
searchable public archive, published by the journalism department at Kingston University. 67 
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 Unlike the  Incedal trials, which took place two years later, the Leveson Inquiry was 
predominantly characterised by an approach of  ‘ positive free speech ’, where access was 
not only secured by the intervention of third parties challenging restrictions; the inquiry 
proactively considered, promoted and protected speech from the outset. Although the 
evidence and report could have been made even more accessible to online readers, the chair 
considered public access beyond the terms of the Inquiries Act, and gave the public audi-
ence an opportunity to access materials directly without relying on a mainstream media 
proxy. In this way, public accountability and the public right to receive information was not 
only served through passive policies of access, or reactive decisions. 
 It is important to note, however, that Lord Justice Leveson went beyond what he was 
required to do by statute. Th e openness of an inquiry is still very much at the discretion 
of the chair, and a less diligent chair may not have made such great eff orts to publicise 
materials eff ectively. Clearer guidance for inquiries would give better protection to this type 
of  ‘ positive free speech ’. It would help inquiry chairs navigate questions over digital publi-
cations: for example, the nature of material that should be published and when it should 
be published became important questions during the Azelle Rodney Inquiry in 2012. 68 It 
could also recommend publication methods to inquiry chairs that would enable more user-
friendly formats than enormous PDFs, and make explicit the arrangements for archiving 
proceedings in the National Archives. 
 Finally, it should be remembered that a public inquiry is distinct from ordinary court 
proceedings, and this has aided the greater openness of inquiry proceedings. A public 
inquiry will have greater fi nancial resources to allow the appointment of a dedicated press 
offi  ce and special audiovisual and online technology arrangements. Additionally, while an 
inquiry may be alert to any potential contempt arising from the evidence (aff ecting an ongo-
ing related trial, for example) it is free from many of the contempt of court issues that must 
be dealt with in the courts when publicising their activities. 
 IV. Open Data from the Courts 
 Th e obligation to open proceedings can be understood as a positive measure, but as the 
case studies above illustrate, this can take many diff erent forms, depending on the type and 
particular circumstances of the proceeding, the attitude and interpretation of the presiding 
judge, and interventions by the parties involved. Th e criteria for openness are somewhat 
hazy. How might more clarity be achieved ? One solution might be to look to the govern-
ment ’ s policy on open government and its standards on open data. 
 Four UK Open Government National Action Plans have promised to improve 
public access to data. Th e government committed to identify and publish, in the period 
2016 – 18, core data assets to create  ‘ a high quality national information infrastructure, 
making government data more secure and easier to fi nd, store and access ’, and to make 
better use of data assets. It promised to  ‘ encourage and support data-driven techniques 
in policy and service delivery across government departments and encourage the better 
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use of open data in the economy and civil society ’. 69 Its latest plan  ‘ recognises the need to 
deepen previous commitments and improve the quality of the data that has been released ’. 70 
Separately, the Ministry of Justice ’ s Single Departmental Plan for 2015 – 2020, now with-
drawn, promised to:  ‘ open up as much data as possible overall across the MOJ and the 
National Off ender Management Service to enable researchers, academics, charities, the 
media and the wider public understand what is happening in the criminal justice system ’. 71 
Notably, this specifi c commitment is not present in the latest Single Departmental Plan; its 
ambition for data and transparency is draft ed in vaguer terms. 72 
 On the surface, these strategic ambitions seem ideal vehicles through which to enforce 
a positive free speech agenda. A commitment to open data means publishing data that can 
be accessed, shared and reused; such publication should be made  ‘ in an open format, [that] 
is machine readable and is published under a license that allows for free reuse ’. 73 Specifi c 
court data could be opened up in these formats under such an obligation, releasing it from 
the control of private third parties and allowing the public to access data directly without 
relying on imperfect media proxies. 
 For some data, this might be the right approach. If it is appropriate for the data to be 
accessible through search engines and to be reused by any third party  – corporate or non-
profi t  – then the courts and Ministry of Justice should certainly consider collecting and 
publishing data as open data. However, it may be inappropriate for some forms of non-
anonymised data. For example, if HMCTS started to collate complete and accurate sets of 
listings and results data in the criminal courts, which may include individuals ’ names and 
addresses, should this be published as open data ? Off ender rehabilitation rights and the 
so-called  ‘ right to be forgotten ’, or erasure, recognised in data protection law, would need to 
be seriously considered before doing so. 
 Th ere is a valid discussion to be had on what types of data should be open data, and 
whether some data sets should be licensed under particular conditions. In other words, the 
data could be made accessible without being published as open data. Th ere may be alterna-
tive licensing regimes for data sets, or ways of centrally controlling data access that would 
allow appropriate access control in the context of some court data. Whatever formats are 
determined as appropriate for diff erent data sets, there is a timely opportunity for govern-
ment and the judiciary to improve and overhaul the gathering and collection of court data 
with a view to diff erent forms of publication, as the government moves forward with its 
national plan. 74 
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 V. Conclusion: Rethinking Access to Court Information 
 Using the conceptual framework for positive free speech developed in this collection and at 
a workshop that preceded its publication, this chapter has shown the ways in which positive 
and negative free speech is present in the UK court system at both the theoretical and the 
practical level. Accepting the proposition that positive free speech is benefi cial to a func-
tioning democracy, it posits that the state should extend its positive free speech obligations 
in this domain, and more adequately fulfi l those that already exist. In view of the changing 
media landscape (including a decline in specialist legal coverage), and the digital tools avail-
able, the courts should make more proactive positive interventions to protect speech and, 
in tandem, open justice. 
 It is at the practical level that free speech is most at risk; the existing provisions in 
common law and statute  – which can be understood as providing a positive obligation on 
courts  – allow for practice that can signifi cantly inhibit an individual ’ s right to access infor-
mation in the following ways. 
 First, the system is overly reliant on the proactivity and interventions of print and broad-
casting media organisations. It cannot be assumed that media concerns represent public 
concerns, and the media may choose not to report or intervene in cases where the output 
is not obviously  ‘ newsworthy ’, or may focus on acquiring information that serves media 
interests (eg being able to name child defendants) and neglect other sorts of information 
which may fulfi l other civic interests (eg legal argumentation). Additionally, there is a well-
remarked decline in systematic and specialist court reporting by the traditional media owing 
to a reprioritising of resources. If this pattern continues, the public will need other means 
through which to access information from court. Th is could be provided by academic and 
not-for-profi t initiatives, which do not currently enjoy the status and access of the press in 
court processes. Improving and lowering the costs of access to court documents would off er 
access for those otherwise inhibited by their fi nancial circumstances or by a disability. 
 Secondly, the publicity system is oft en inconsistent and arbitrary, with inadequate docu-
mentation of its decisions on transparency, as was exposed by the trials of Erol Incedal. 
Precise guidelines are needed, informed by consultancy among the diff erent parties, or 
their representatives, involved in court processes (eg lawyers, victims, witnesses, the media, 
academic researchers, third sector campaigners) and the wider public, on the way in which 
diff erent sorts of court data should be handled and proactively communicated to public 
audiences. Any system should not be  ‘ one-size-fi ts-all ’, but rather should be appropriately 
designed for diff erent types of civil and criminal proceedings. Such an approach could 
include implementing a well-designed digital system for sharing information about intended 
or active reporting restrictions, further developing the Law Commission ’ s proposed model. 
 A more clearly defi ned procedure for deciding on the appropriate publicity for a case, 
including digital publication of materials, would also help protect the eff ective adminis-
tration of justice, and legitimate ECHR rights associated with, for example, child welfare, 
family and private life, and national security. It could also off er greater accountability of 
court decisions relating to transparency of proceedings. A passive and reactive system of 
non-censorship does not provide adequate free speech or open justice protection; more 
positive free speech, delivered through obligations on the judiciary and courts proactively 
to communicate what happens in court, would serve a broadly defi ned public interest and 
enable fuller participation in civic life. 

